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I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION IN RECORD:
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A.

Issues Presented for Review and Preservation in Record.
1.

specific

Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's

performance

claims with prejudice?

(Preservation

in

Record: 306-23, 1157-77, 1294-96, 1551-55)
2.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's claims

for damages for the two option periods?

(Preservation in Record:

318-23, 1178)
3.
claims?

Did the trial court err in dismissing Brown's fraud

(Preservation in Record: 330-34, 1182-84)
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding the Olches

were under no duty to negotiate in good faith (1) ancillary lease
terms and (2) option period rents?

(Preservation in Record: 323-

28, 1179-82)
5.

Did the trial court err in concluding Appellant

Brown's General Offices was barred as a matter of law from
recovering separate and distinct damages it foreseeably suffered?
(Preservation in Record: 1184-85)
6.

Did the trial err in ruling on Brown's equitable

claims before the jury had ruled on Brown's legal claims that were
based on common facts?
7.

(Preservation in Record: 1549-1551, 1556)

Did the trial court err in finding certain facts

were undisputed?

(Preservation in Record: 1359, 1369, 1468-69,

1522-31)
1

B.

Standard of Review,

Each

of

these

issues

either

(1) presents

purely

legal

questions for review, or (2) requires this Court to determine the
consequences of written material. Accordingly, each is subject to
correction-of-error/de novo review1.
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

None.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Appellants
General Offices

Brown's

Shoe

Fit

Co.; Tom

Brown; and

Brown's

(collectively "Brown's") brought this action to

specifically enforce a commercial lease agreement reached with
Appellees Jon Olch; Janet Olch; Henry Sigg; and 33 0 Main Street
Partners
recover

(collectively the "Olches") or, in the alternative, to
damages

resulting

from

the

Olches'

breach

of

that

agreement. Brown's also sought damages resulting from the Olches'
fraud.
B.

Course of Proceedings,

On November 22, 1995

the Olches moved

to dismiss all of

Brown's Claims (R. 203) . Judge Frank E. Noel denied that motion at
a December 11, 1995 hearing, ruling that "there was a contract and
it has sufficient terms to be enforced and it was the intent of the

1

844
247
229
App.
461

See e.g.. Estate Landscaping v. Mountain States Telephone,
P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,
(Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225,
(Utah 1987); In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah
1988); Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460,
(Utah App. 1988).
2

parties to be bound by the terms of 'a lease' . "

(R. 495; Addendum

("Add.") B ) .
On April 26, 1996, after Judge Pat B. Brian had assumed the
Summit County bench, the Olches again moved for summary judgment on
essentially

the

same

December 11 hearing
motion

(R.

1060)

grounds

Judge

Noel

had

rejected

at

the

(R. 793) . Judge Brian refused to hear that

because

it

was

too

late

under

the

court's

February 26, 1996 Scheduling Order (R. 573).
The Olches then requested a hearing to receive "guidance"
regarding the conduct of the upcoming June 11 trial (R. 1544-45).
Rather

than

seeking guidance, however,

the Olches

immediately

turned the hearing into yet another attempt to have the trial court
dismiss Brown's claims (R. 1546-1550). At that June 6 hearing (five
days before trial) the Olches, for the first time, argued that
tenants who — after Brown's commenced this action — leased the same
property Brown's had leased from the Olches (the "Tenants") were
necessary parties to the action (R. 1548) . During the hearing the
trial court indicated it was familiar with, and had read (R.1546),
a

trial brief

from

the Olches

that Brown's

counsel

had

only

received an hour before the hearing (R. 1552).
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court scheduled
argument on the dismissal of Brown's claims for five days later,
two hours before the commencement of jury voir dire

(R. 1568) .

During that June 11 hearing, the trial court made the rulings
involved in this appeal.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court,

After argument — only a few minutes before trial — the trial
court ruled it would let the jury to decide if the Basic Lease
3

represented an enforceable agreement for the initial three-year
term that would entitle Brown's to damages

(R. 1350). The trial

court had already summarily dismissed Brown's other claims (R.
1269, 1294-97, 1317-49, 1337-38). The parties thereafter stipulated
to dismissal of Brown's remaining claim pending appellate review of
the trial court's summary dismissals (R. 1269).
D.

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented.
1.

The Parties.

Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co. is a partnership organized to
operate

a shoe

Appellants

store

in Park

City, Utah

Tom Brown and Brown's General

(R. 1419, Add. C) .
Offices

are the two

partners in the proposed Park City store (R. 1419, Add. C) and were
also partners in other Brown's partnerships operating family shoe
stores in Colorado, South Dakota, Arizona and California (R. 458) .
Appellee

33 0

Main

Street

Partners

("Partners")

is

a

partnership formed for the purpose of owning land and developing an
office

building

at

340

Main

Street,

Park

City,

Utah

(the

"Property"). Appellees Jon Olch, Janet Olch and Henry Sigg ("Sigg")
are partners in Partners (R. 1419; Add. C ) .
2.
In

the

The Background to this Action.
latter

part

of

the

1980's

numerous

salespersons who serviced many of Brown's other stores

wholesale
(R. 458)

commented to Brown's personnel about the opportunity for a shoe
store in Park City. These shoe representatives felt that due to the
absence of an independent family shoe store, there was a need in
Park City for a shoe store like the ones operated elsewhere by
various Brown's partnerships.

4

In early 1989, Tom Brown contacted the Park City Chamber of
Commerce and asked them to send him current information on housing,
retail sales, economic profiles and any other information that
would be necessary for Brown's to evaluate the Park City market
further (R. 701-16).
After reviewing this information, Brown's readily concluded
that Park City had many characteristics

similar to those of

Durango, Colorado, where Brown's operated two stores (R. 699-700) .
Brown's used its Durango operations as the benchmark for making
many of Brown's decisions to move ahead with their plan to open a
Park City store (R. 700) . As with Durango, when Brown's first went
to Park City there were no other shoe stores there. Brown's also
considered how Park City fit into Brown's then-existing operations.
After reaching these conclusions, Tom Brown called a Park City
realtor regarding available retail space suitable for a proposed
shoe store. Over the course of the next two years Tom Brown
investigated several possible locations. Tom Brown concluded that
only locations in the Historic Main Street area would be of
interest. However, none of the then-available locations could
satisfy all of Brown's requirements for a retail family shoe store.
Through the remainder of 1989 until 1992, Tom Brown made
several trips to Park City as part of his ongoing investigation of
potential locations as they became available. On one of his trips
to Park City, Mr. Brown noticed that one of the best retail
locations in Park City had a "FOR LEASE" sign in the front window
with a number to call for additional information. Mr. Brown called
that number. That call was Brown's first contact with Henry Sigg.

5

Sigg offered to help Brown's find a Main Street location, and
during the next several months Tom Brown and Sigg spoke often by
phone

about

Brown's

ongoing

search

for

a

suitable

Park

City

location (R. 250) .
On October 8, 1993, Sigg called Brown and told him of a
location that would be available during the fourth quarter of 1994
(R. 444) . Sigg indicated the general leasing terms and asked Brown
to send a "letter of intent" to Jon Olch, the prospective landlord
(R. 89) . When Mr. Brown asked what form the letter should take, and
what information it should contain, Sigg telecopied Brown a copy of
such a letter already prepared by an architect who was also a
prospective tenant at the Property. Brown prepared the letter (R.
991) according to Sigg's instructions and mailed it to Sigg.
After

that

conversation,

Brown

and

Sigg

had

repeated

discussions about Brown's occupancy of a portion of the Property
(R. 4 93). On February 12 Tom Brown finally met with Jon Olch to
discuss occupancy terms (R. 89). At the meeting Jan Olch told Tom
Brown that Sigg would represent Partners in finalizing the terms
for Brown's occupancy of the Property.
3.

The Execution of the Basic Lease.

That evening, Tom Brown and Sigg went out to "toast" the
reaching of an agreement in principle regarding Brown's future
tenancy. During the days immediately following February 12, Tom
Brown and Sigg had many discussions concerning the specific terms
of Brown's occupancy of the Property.
On February 15, upon his return to California, Brown sent a
letter addressed jointly to Jon Olch and Sigg summarizing the lease
terms discussed at the February 12, 1994 meeting (R. 88). In that
6

letter, Brown outlined various proposed lease terms, requested a
verbal agreement to the proposal, and requested confirmation from
Sigg and Jon Olch that projected occupancy of the Building would be
approximately November 15 to December 1, 1994 (R. 88).
During

a February 16 phone

conversation between

Sigg

and

Brown, Sigg indicated he had discussed Brown's February 15 letter
with Jon Olch, and that Jon Olch required some modifications to
Brown's February 15 proposal. In particular, Sigg told Brown that
Brown's proposed 6% override on sales should apply to all sales
over $600,000 during the initial 3-year term of the lease (R. 88).
On February 18 Brown sent Sigg a revised outline of lease terms
incorporating Sigg's requested changes (R. 89).
On March 18 Tom Brown, acting for Brown's, and Sigg, acting
for Partners, executed a document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions"
(the "Basic Lease") (R. 67, Add. A) memorializing their agreement
on all essential terms of Brown's future occupancy of a portion of
the Property (the "Premises") for an initial three-year period and
for two (2) three-year option periods. The Basic Lease explicitly
recited that the parties had "agreed to" its terms.
The Basic Lease provided that the rent for the initial period,
and for each option period, would be based on (1) agreed-upon persquare-foot rental rates; and (2) a percentage override on Brown's
Park City sales above a certain gross-volume threshold. The grossvolume threshold was specified
period. No

for the first

further negotiation was necessary,

three-year

lease

therefore, with

respect to the rental amount for the initial three-year term. It
was fixed. Brown's and Partners agreed, however, that although the
Basic Lease established minimum per-square-foot rents, the parties
7

would negotiate the gross-volume thresholds before each option
period to the level necessary to charge fair market rent (R. 4 62,
1370).
4.

Events Following Execution of the Basic Lease.

Brown's immediately proceeded to order inventory for the Park
City store and to make plans to occupy the Premises later that
year.

Sigg

went

so

far

as

to

encourage

Brown's

to

ship

the

approximately $170,000 worth of shoes it had ordered for sale in
Park City to a storage facility Sigg owned in Park City so the
shoes would be readily accessible when Brown's moved into the
Premises in November or December of 1994

(R. 1303-04). Brown's

chose instead to have the Park City shoes shipped from the various
manufacturers to Brown's Grand Junction, Colorado store. Brown's
intended to transport that inventory to Park City when the Premises
became ready for occupancy. Brown's also transferred

personnel

within and among other Brown's stores in anticipation of moving a
hand-picked manager to Park City. The Olches knew Brown's was
ordering inventory and transferring personnel in reliance on the
Olches' promises (R. 492).
Through their words and acts the Olches told Brown's they
would

be

the

Olches'

tenant

at

the

Premises. Unbeknownst

to

Brown's, however, the Olches' had an unspoken agenda throughout
this period. In March 1994 the Olches needed a commitment letter
from a prospective tenant to present to a lending institution to
obtain a construction loan (R. 461, 888). Consequently, while the
Olches gave outward indications that they were negotiating for
Brown's occupancy of the Premises, the Olches were pretending to
agree to Brown's tenancy solely for the purpose of obtaining a
8

tenant

commitment

required by

its lender as condition

to the

Olches' financing. Although they pretended to be negotiating, the
Olches had no intention of honoring their agreement with Brown's.
Brown's had no idea the Olches did not intend to comply with the
Basic Lease terms.
As 1994 progressed, Brown's began to pressure the Olches to
discuss occupancy. Jon Olch first asked Tom Brown to postpone
discussion

of

occupancy

and

terms

unspecified approvals from Park City

until

the

Olches

received

(R. 463) . As time passed

Brown's made repeated demands that the Olches prepare the "final
lease

document"

called

for

by

the

Basic

Lease.

Finally,

on

October 13, 1994, Jon Olch wrote Brown's (R. 888) reasserting that
the Basic Lease was only a "preliminary letter of intent prepared
for the purpose of a possible loan application," but enclosed a
proposed

lease

(R. 45-66) with the letter. Brown's

responded,

through counsel, that the Olches' proposed lease was commercially
unreasonable and unsignable2, was not proposed in good faith, and
contained terms directly contrary to the provisions the parties had
expressly agreed to in the Basic Lease (R. 3 9-44).
On November 3, 1994, through counsel, the Olches submitted a
second proposed lease that was as commercially unreasonable as the
Olches' first proposal (R. 18-38). On February 26, 1995, after the
Olches

failed

to respond

to Brown's

stated objections

to the

Olches' proposed documents, Brown's submitted a lease consistent
with the Basic Lease that Brown's would sign. The Olches never
2

For example, the Olches' proposed lease required Brown's to
vacate in mid-tenancy if the Olches' sold the Property (R. 47) , and
to post a letter of credit equal to 100% of Brown's annualized rent
(R. 62) .
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responded to Brown's proposals. Brown's accordingly

filed this

action on April 10, 1995 (R. 91).
Several months after Brown's filed its Complaint the Olches
rented the Premises to non-party tenants

(The "Tenants"), whom

nobody made parties to this action (R. 1422). The Tenants' leases
with the Olches contained a higher rental rate and none of the
onerous

provisions

Brown's

had

repeatedly

contended

were

commercially unreasonable and proposed in bad faith (R. 1175) .
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

To be specifically enforceable, an agreement such as the Basic
Lease need not contain immaterial provisions reserved for future
determination

by

the

parties.

Similarly,

the

fact

that

an

agreement such as the Basic Lease contemplates incorporation of its
terms into a more formal document does not invalidate the original
agreement.
The Basic Lease contains all material

terms necessary

create a binding lease for the initial three-year period.
routinely

fill

in missing

industry custom.

ancillary

terms

based

on

to

Courts

local

or

Such "gap-filling" is especially simple in this

case because the Olches have executed two leases for the very
Property at issue in this litigation.

Those two leases are more

than sufficient to permit a court to set ancillary lease terms.
Notwithstanding its professed concerns about the missing terms
in the Basic Lease, the trial court indicated it would nevertheless
let

the

jury

consider

Brown's

specific

performance

claims

if

Brown's would agree not to disturb the Tenants who leased the
Property after Brown's filed this action.
that

suggestion,

the

trial

court
10

When Brown's rejected

dismissed

Brown's

specific

performance claims with prejudice because no one had joined the
Tenants in this action. In doing so, the trial court concluded the
Tenants were "indispensable" parties. Brown's contends that the
trial court erred in this conclusion.

Even if that conclusion is

correct, however, the trial court still erred because (1) nonjoinder of

"indispensable" parties requires dismissal without

prejudice; and (2) a trial court is prohibited from ruling on
equitable actions before the jury has rendered its verdict.
Relying on two Utah Supreme Court decisions, the trial court
erroneously accepted the blanket proposition that "agreements to
agree" are never enforceable.

As a result, the trial court

dismissed Brown's specific performance claims for the two renewal
periods.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court ignored

numerous Utah Supreme Court opinions, and opinions of this Court,
that specifically enforced "agreements to agree".

Moreover, the

cases the trial court relied on are factually distinguishable and
outdated.

They considered neither the Utah Legislature's policy

decision that "agreements to agree" are now enforceable, nor the
overriding duty to conduct contractual negotiations in good faith.
The evidence at trial would have been that Brown's and the
Olches had agreed to negotiate option-period rents to a "fairmarket" rental level. Utah law requires trial courts to determine
fair-market value, and they do so routinely.

The Olches are

required to negotiate that renewal rate in good faith.

Even if,

however, the trial court was correct in refusing to order specific
performance of the two option periods, it erroneously refused to
permit the jury to determine Brown's damages for the two option
periods, because damages can arise from agreements too indefinite
11

to sustain a specific performance award.
erred

in

refusing

to

permit

the

The trial court also

jury

to

determine

the

particularized and foreseeable damages of Appellant Brown's General
Offices.
The trial court never came to grips with, and made no specific
rulings regarding, Brown's claims that the Olches violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing through their repeated
demands

that

Brown's

sign

leases

that

significantly

changed

material Basic Lease terms, and contained commercially unreasonable
ancillary terms.

Claims that parties failed to act in good faith

are reserved for jury determination except in rare cases.

This is

not such a case.
In dismissing

Brown's

fraud

and

fraudulent

nondisclosure

claims, the trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law that
the Olches' representations that they would honor the Basic Lease
at a time the Olches had no intention of doing so were not of a
"presently existing fact".

The trial court also erroneously ruled

as a matter of law that a person can never reasonably rely on an
unenforceable agreement.
Brown's seeks reversal of all these rulings.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Brown's
Performance Claims.
1.

Specific

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Basic Lease
Was Too Vague and Indefinite for Enforcement of the
Initial Three-Year Term.

With respect to the initial three-year occupancy period the
trial court concluded:
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2. Utah law is clear that in order for specific performance to
lie, the agreement must be clear and definite. The Basic Lease
Provisions is too vague and indefinite for this court to order
specific performance thereof, including the two (2) option
periods.
The

trial

unenforceable
document.

The

court

because
Basic

concluded
it

that

anticipated

Lease

begins:

the

Basic

negotiation
"Following

Lease
of

are

a

was

second

terms

and

conditions agreed upon . . . to be incorporated into the final
lease document executed by both parties," (R. 67, Add. A; 1420,
Add. C) (emphasis added).
Very few points of mutual agreement are necessary to create a
valid lease:
First, a definite agreement as to the extent and boundary
of the property to be leased; second, a definite and
agreed term; and third, a definite and agreed rental and
the time and manner of its payment.
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580
(1952); C&Y Corporation v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47,
52

(Utah App. 1995)

(!I/[i]t is not necessary that the contract

itself contain all of the particulars of the agreement. The crucial
question is whether the parties agreed on the essential terms of
the contract.'") (emphasis added); English v. Standard Optical Co. ,
814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah App. 1991).
Similarly, " [t]he fact that part of the performance is that
the parties will enter into a contract in the future does not
render the original agreement any less binding."

Bunnell v. Bills,

13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962). Merely because the
parties recited that a "lease" would be prepared containing the
terms memorialized in the Basic Lease does not mean one party's
obdurate refusal to prepare such a document makes the original
contract

disappear:

"If

a

written
13

agreement

is

intended

to

memorialize an oral contract, a subsequent failure to execute the
written document does not nullify the oral contract."
Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d

382, 384

Lawrence

(Utah 1982). As a

result, "that the parties contemplated subsequent execution of a
written agreement as evidence of that agreement did not prevent the
oral agreement from binding the parties."

Id.

Utah appellate courts follow § 33 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. See, e.g., Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d
368, 373 (Utah 1996); Piston v. Enviropak Medical Prods., Inc., 893
P.2d

1071,

1075-76

(Utah App.

1995).

Illustration

9 to

§ 33

provides: "A promises B to execute a . . . lease for a year of
specified land and B promises to make specified payments therefor.
Although

the

terms

of

leases

.

.

. vary,

the

promises

are

interpreted as providing for documents in the form in common local
use, and are sufficiently definite to form contracts."

(emphasis

added).
Courts in other jurisdictions are in accord with Utah law and
§33. In Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 297 (3d
Cir. 1986) two parties signed a letter of intent to negotiate the
terms of a lease. Before the parties had agreed on lease terms, the
lessor leased the premises to a third party. Finding that the
parties

intended3

to be

bound

by

the

terms

of

their

initial

agreement, the Grossman court held the lessor was obligated to
negotiate ancillary lease terms in good faith:
It is hornbook law that evidence of preliminary
investigations or an agreement to enter into a binding
contract in the future does not alone constitute a
3

Judge Frank G. Noel explicitly ruled the parties intended
"to be bound" by the Basic Lease (R. 4 95, Add. B) . Because the
trial court never made a contrary finding, Judge Noel's
determination regarding intent is the law of this case.
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contract. Appellees believe that this doctrine settles
this case, but, in so arguing, appellees misconstrue
Channel's contract claim. Channel does not contend that
the letter of intent is binding as a lease or an
agreement to enter into a lease. Rather, it is Channel's
position that this document is enforceable as a mutually
binding obligation to negotiate in good faith.
Id. at p. 298 (citations omitted). 4
See also 1 Joseph M. Perillo et al. , Corbin on Contracts (Rev.
ed., 1993) § 2.8 at 136-38:
We must not jump too readily to the conclusion that a
contract has not been made from the fact of apparent
incompleteness. People do business in a very informal
fashion, using abbreviated and elliptical language. A
transaction is complete when the parties mean it to be
complete. It is a mere matter of interpretation of their
expressions to each other, a question of fact. An
expression is no less effective that it is found by the
method of implication. The parties may not give verbal
expression to such vitally important matters as price,
place and time of delivery, time of payment, amount of
goods, and yet they may actually have agreed upon them.
This may be shown by their antecedent expressions, their
past action and custom, and other circumstances. If the
parties have manifested an intent to be bound, the
agreement should not be struck down because of the
difficulty of administration unless it is quite clear
that the court can only fill in the gaps in the dark.
Even though certain matters are expressly left to be
agreed upon in the future, they may not be regarded by
4

Other courts similarly hold that incompleteness does not
prevent contract formation. See, e.g., Arok Construction Co. v.
Indian Constr. Servs. , 848 P.2d 870, 876, 878 (Ariz. App. 1993)
("the actions of the parties may show conclusively that they have
intended to conclude a binding agreement even though one or more
terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases,
courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite
meaning to the bargain. Formal execution may be a mere formality
and have little to do with the actual existence of the contract.") ;
Coleman Eng'g Co. v. North Am. Aviation. 420 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal.
1966) ("Where matters left for future agreement are unessential,
each party will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of
the unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left
unperformed and the remainder of the contract enforced."); Herzog
Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Otto Torpedo Co.. 570 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa.
Super. 1990).
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the parties as essential to their present agreement.
Furthermore, the terms left for future settlement may be
within definite and prescribed limits.
This doctrine applies to leases: " [A] contract to give a lease
need not set out all the possible terms of the formal document. The
lease may be sufficiently complete with only a few terms; and it is
possible to include other terms in accordance with the custom of
the time and place."

5A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts

(1964) § 1174 at 286.
In City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D.D.C.
1967),

aff'd per

curiam,

394

F.2d

950

(D.C. Cir.

1968),

the

landlord gave a prospective tenant an option to lease a store to be
constructed in a shopping mall on terms at least equal to those of
any

other major department store in the mall. When the landlord

repudiated, the tenant sought specific performance. Despite the
absence of details regarding (1) the design or construction of the
store; (2) the amount of space to be occupied by the tenant; and
(3) the rent to be paid, the court nevertheless granted specific
performance. In doing so it held that the missing terms of the
lease, such as space and rent, could be determined by examining
comparable leases in the mall and that all other terms, including
the details of construction, could be worked out with the help of
a special master or an arbitrator. Jd. at p. 778.
Courts have availed themselves of various aids in determining
the scope of an incomplete agreement. Where a contract is silent
about a detail of performance or leaves terms to be agreed on by
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the parties, courts look to various sources to determine the scope
of contractual obligations.5
The law of this case establishes that Brown's and the Olches'
intended

to

contract. The Basic

Lease

contains

all

essential

provisions for the initial three-year term.6 Numerous sources exist
5

See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Stoneman, 123 N.E. 679, 680681 (Mass. 1919) (agreement to heat building, though indefinite on
its face, may be enforced in light of defendant's past behavior in
supplying heat for 24 hours a day) ; Boevincr v. Vandover, 218 S.W.2d
175, 179 (Mo. 1949) (absence of terms describing automobile is no
bar to specific performance where buyer viewed and accepted a
particular car); Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 116 (S.D.
1985) (buyer's insistence on 30-year mortgage belied by accepted of
seven-year loan on another piece of property).
Numerous other cases establish that a custom usage of the
trade, or a provision borrowed from comparable contracts, will
furnish the basis for applying appropriate terms. See, e.g. ,
Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 838 (Alaska 1971) (omitted terms may
be supplied by looking to the experience of other service
stations); Fran Realty Co. v. Thomas, 354 A.2d 196, 198, 201 (Md.
App. 1976) (house to be built in accordance with specifications of
model home); Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc. , 62 A.2d 383, 388
(N.J. 1948) (defendant ordered to grant plaintiff same terms as
those offered to other members of cooperative); North Coast
Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 388 (Oh. 1984)
(court may determine subsidiary terms by looking to custom and
practice in the field).
6

Parties need to agree on only location, duration and rent
to create a valid lease. See English, 814 P.2d at 616. The Basic
Lease reflects agreement on each essential point:
The Location of the Premises is Clear. The parties agreed the
leasehold Premises would range from 1750 to 1850 square feet as per
approved plan. It further provides the location of the Premises is
a building "to be located at approximately 33 0 Main Street, Park
City, Utah." (R. 67; Add. A ) . A street address is a definite and
ascertainable description of property. See, e.g., Park West
Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1986).
Accordingly, the Basic Lease Provisions expressly gives Brown's the
right to occupy between 1750 and 1850 square feet of in a building
to be constructed at 330 Main Street in Park City, Utah.
The Duration of the Lease is Fully Identified. The Basic Lease
Provisions recites: "The initial lease will be for three years.
Lessee will have the option to renew the lease for two additional
three-year option periods. The terms and conditions of the option
periods are specified herein and will be incorporated into the
lease agreement."
(R. 67; Add. A) The duration of the lease is
clear and unambiguous.
(continued...)
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for

the

determination

of

nonessential,

ancillary

terms.

In

particular, the lease the Olches executed with other Tenants for
the Premises shows the ancillary terms the Olches would accept from
any tenant but Brown's. The trial court erred in concluding it
could not order specific performance of the initial three-year
Basic Lease period.
This court should reverse the trial court and instruct it to
order the Olches to lease the Premises to Brown's for the initial
three-year period on the ancillary terms the Olches have agreed to
with other Tenants of the Property.
2.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Tenants
Occupying the Premises Were Indispensable Parties.

The trial court further concluded that, even if the Basic
Leases were definite

enough

for specific performance,

Brown's

claims were still barred as a matter of law.
3. [T]he tenants now occupying the space within the area
subject of the parties' negotiations are indispensable
parties and would be required to be joined to this action
in order for Plaintiffs to pursue the remedy of specific
performance."
(R. 1424).
The trial court stated the basis for this legal conclusion in
its Finding Nos. 16 & 17:
16. Subsequent to the time that the Plaintiffs filed this
action, the space that is the subject of this litigation
was leased to one or more third parties who were not
joined as parties to this action.

6

(...continued)
The Rental Amount is Clear. The Basic Lease Provisions further
provides for a base rent at a specified rate per foot along with a
percentage of gross volume above a specified sales level. It makes
clear all rent will be on a triple net basis, plus a pro rata share
of property taxes, insurance and utilities, and that the first
three year period will not include a CPI increase. The rental
during this initial three-year period is therefore clear and
completely set forth.
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17. Such tenants claim an interest in the Property and
the disposition of Plaintiffs' specific performance claim
in the absence of such tenants as parties to this action
may impair or impede their ability to protect that
interest and/or leave the parties subject
to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or
otherwise inconsistent obligations. There is no reason
presented to the court that such tenants could not have
been joined in this action (R. 1422-23, Add. C) .
The issue of the Tenants' "indispensability" arose for the
first time on June 6, 1996, five days before the beginning of trial
(R.

1537,

1554) .

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

defined

an

"indispensable" party as one "whose presence is required for a full
and fair determination of his rights as well as the rights of other
parties to the suit."

Bonneville Tower Condominium Management

Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) .
The Tenants are not "indispensable" parties.
In Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Pes Moines
Shopping Center, Inc. , 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977), a jeweler sued
its landlord to enjoin the lessor from honoring a lease with a
competing jeweler. Plaintiff jeweler did not, however, name the
competing tenant. The lessor moved, pursuant to Rule 19, to dismiss
the action because the Plaintiff had not joined the competing
tenant as a party Defendant.
In finding the non-party tenant was not indispensable, the
court reasoned that "none of

[the non-party tenant's] rights or

obligations will be ultimately determined in a suit to which it is
not a party."

Id. at p. 819. Instead, that tenant retained "all of

its rights under its Lease Agreement with

[the landlord] . "

Id.

Similarly, the Tenants at the Premises will retain all of their
rights under their leases with the Olches. This action between
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Brown's and the Olches is legally incapable of determining the
Tenants' rights.
The Helzberg's court also found the non-party tenants would
not

incur

any

of

the

litigation because any inconsistency resulted solely "from

[the

landlord's]

inconsistent

voluntary

obligations

execution of

as

a

result

two Lease Agreements

which

impose inconsistent obligations rather than from

[the non-party

tenant's] absence from the present proceedings."

Finally, The

Helzberg court relied on the general rule that "a person does not
become indispensable to an action because that person's rights or
obligations under an entirely separate contract will be affected by
the result of the action."

Id.

Furthermore, the Tenants chose not to intervene. When, as
here, a non-party fails to intervene, that failure indicates the
non-party does not deem its own interests substantially threatened
by the litigation, and a court should not "second-guess" the nonparty's decision. See, e.g. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 849
(1983); United States v. Sabine Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480, 483 (5th
Cir. 1982).
The Tenants are not indispensable parties.
3.

Even If the Tenants Are Indispensable, The Trial
Court
Erred
in
Dismissing
Brown's
Specific
Performance Claims With
Prejudice
for Brown's
Failure to Join the Tenants.

The trial court's third conclusion continues: "Plaintiffs'
failure to join the tenants as parties mandates — as a matter of
law — the dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiff's specific
performance claims." (R. 1424, Add. C) In fact, the trial court
20

made clear that its dismissal of Brown's specific performance
claims resulted from the non-joinder of the Tenants, not from any
incompleteness

in the Basic Lease

Provisions:

" [I]f you can

represent to the Court that the third party, who presently occupies
the premises, is not going to be disturbed in the use of the
facility for the next nine years, let's take this question of
specific performance to the jury."
In

Bonneville

Towers,

the

(R. 1290)
trial

court

dismissed

the

plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because it had failed to join
necessary parties. In reversing that dismissal, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
the action with prejudice. See Bonneville Towers, 728 P. 2d at 1020.
Even if this Court holds the Tenants were "indispensable", the
trial court nevertheless committed reversible error in dismissing
Brown's specific performance claim with prejudice.
4.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding it Could not
Order Specific Performance of the Two Basic Lease
Option Periods.

The trial court also erred in its ruling that it could not
specifically enforce the two option periods described in the Basic
Lease. The trial court dismissed Brown's specific performance
i

claims for the two option periods because it believed the law
absolutely prohibited the enforcement of "agreements to agree".
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on two
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, Pingree v. Continental Group
of Utah, Inc. , 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976) and Cottonwood Mall Co. v.
Sine, 767 P. 2d 499 (Utah 1988) . Since the trial court's ruling, the
Utah Supreme Court has once again referred to Pingree. See Richard
Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996). None
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of these three cases mandates or even supports the trial court's
conclusion that Brown's and the Olches' agreement for the two Basic
Lease option periods was unenforceable.
a.

Utah
Appellate
Courts
"Agreements to Agree."

Routinely

Enforce

In Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (1970)
buyer

Kier

sued

for

specific

performance

of

a

land

purchase

agreement. Seller Condrack responded that the agreement was an
unenforceable "agreement to agree" due to language in the agreement
that payment was to be made "upon terms to be agreed upon". Citing
court decisions from eight states, the dissent argued the agreement
was unenforceable due to the obvious need for future agreement. See
id. at 332-35. In nevertheless affirming the trial court's specific
performance decree, two Condrack justices concluded:
[T] he trial court was justified in believing that the
defendants were not acting in good faith but were simply
offering excuses to justify their refusal to honor the
plaintiff's exercise of the option because they had
changed their minds about their agreement. It was
therefore within his prerogative as a court of equity to
decree what equity and good conscience required: the
specific performance of the contract.
Id. at 331
The third concurring Condrack justice was even more blunt:
If equity cannot step into a case with
those existing here, then a plague on
equity, whose professed purpose is
intentions of the parties, which are
ordinary court of law.

circumstances like
the institution of
to carry out the
unavailable in the

Id. at 332 (Henriod, J., concurring).
In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) , the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the specific enforceability of a contract in
which the only term fixed was the purchase price. Among other
omissions, the contract specified neither the time for payment nor
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the amount to be paid. In holding none of these omissions was a bar
to specific performance, the Utah Supreme Court held:
We have no disagreement with the general proposition that
a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the
obligations of the parties are "set forth with sufficient
definiteness that it can be performed." But to be
considered therewith is the further proposition that the
parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good
faith to cooperate in performing the contract in
accordance with its express intent. A contract is not
fatally defective as to price if there is an agreement as
to some formula or method for fixing it. Quite beyond
this, one party to a contract cannot be willful act or
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to
perform and then invoke the other's non-performance as a
defense (emphasis added).
Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377

(Utah 1980) involved a

realty sales contract. The trial court found the earnest money
receipt

and offer to purchase were

too vague, incomplete

ambiguous to be capable of specific performance

and

therefore

unenforceable. In reversing, the Utah Supreme Court held:
Neither does the "terms to be arranged" condition present
in the initial agreement defeat the enforcement of the
contract. The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
provided the total purchase price of the property would
be $70,000 which would be payable upon "terms to be
arranged." The trial court determined the inclusion of
this language rendered the agreement subject to future
negotiation and therefore unenforceable. We disagree.
There is no principle of equity that demands all terms of
a contract must be set forth in the written agreement.
Rather, although an agreement is uncertain or incomplete
in
some
respects,
its
specific
enforcement
may
nevertheless be decreed for the uncertainty relates to
matters which the law makes certain or complete by
presumption, rule or custom and usage.
* * *

When the major aspects of a contract are specified with
requisite certainty, this Court will not allow incidental
details such as the terms of payment in a contract for
the sale of realty to deny specific performance.
Id. at pp. 1378-79 (emphasis added).
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and

In Tanner v. Baadsgaard,

612 P.2d

345, 347

(Utah

1980),

defendant Baadsgaard argued the plaintiff Tanner could not receive
specific performance because Tanner had neither met the contractual
conditions nor made required payments. The Court affirmed the trial
court's decree of specific performance:
We have no doubts as to the correctness of defendant's
assertion that, in order to warrant specific performance,
the essential terms of the contract must be sufficiently
definite to enable the parties to understand what their
obligations are. But the proper application of that rule
is as a shield to protect from injustice, and not as a
weapon with which to work an injustice. In regard to the
defendant's claim of uncertainty:
We think the trial
court was also justified in finding that the agreement
that interest would be paid from the time it took to
complete the transaction, did not result in any such
uncertainty, as to prevent specific performance. Whatever
else may be said about uncertainty as to the payment of
interest, we observe that this claim of error is also
governed by the rule alluded to above: that the parties
are duty bound to cooperate in good faith to carry out
their original intent (emphasis added).
Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429
suit

for

specific

performance

of

a

(Utah 1980) involved a

contract

to

sell

realty.

Defendant Watts argued the terms of the contract were unclear, and
that the contract was ambiguous. In particular, Watts argued the
contract was unenforceable because:

(1) no date was given for the

payment of the balance due; (2) the description of the property
contained inaccuracies; (3) the buyer did not give a bid on carpet
installation as part of the price, as set out in the offer to
purchase;

(4) the offer was subject to the Buyer's obtaining a

septic tank permit and no permit was issued; and, (5) there were
omissions regarding improvements, closing date, and commission.
In affirming the trial court's determination that the parties'
contract was sufficiently definite, the Utah Supreme Court held
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that such omissions and errors were immaterial and no bar to the
specific performance of a real estate contract. See id. at 429-30.
In Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah App. 1988) the
parties to a lease agreed to adjust the lease rate according to the
"United States Cost of Living Index". The trial court concluded the
phrase was ambiguous because no index with that name existed, and
consequently admitted extrinsic evidence to ascertain what the
parties intended or assumed by its use. Based on that evidence, the
trial court found the parties intended to use a general index
applicable to the entire United States. See id. at 1231.
On appeal the lessees argued that enforcement of the ambiguous
provision would amount to the improper rewriting of the transaction
on terms the court believed to be fair. In rejecting that argument
the Barnes court held: "[T]he court did not rewrite the agreement;
rather, it admitted extrinsic evidence to determine what the
parties meant by the use of the term." Id.
In English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah
App. 1991) a lease provided that future rent "shall be negotiated
every 3 6 months."

The lessor contended the lease had expired by

its terms because of their failure to establish a written renewal
rate. This court found the lease was enforceable notwithstanding
the "agreement to agree". In its analysis, it held Pingree and
Cottonwood Mall were not applicable because the leases in both
those cases had already expired. See id. at 617 n.4.
In Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 290
(Utah App. 1994) Republic located a purchaser for Won-Door7s stock
under an agreement allowing Republic a "reasonable fee".

Relying

on Pingxee, Won-Door asserted the parties' minds never met on the
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amount of a reasonable fee, and that the contract was therefore
unenforceable.

This Court rejected that argument and found the

parties had intended a reasonable amount.

See id. at 291. In

remanding to the trial court, this Court held:
Accordingly, the determination of a reasonable fee would
neither conflict with express contract terms nor be
extremely difficult to accomplish. Thus we find genuine
issues of material fact which must be resolved to
determine whether a contract was in place, and if so,
what the terms of the agreement were at the. time of the
alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Id.
b.

Pinaree

Does Not Reflect Current Law

The Utah Supreme Court opinions in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern
rely

solely

on

the

earlier

Pingree

decision.

The

two

later

decisions uncritically cited Pinaree without considering new laws
and legal doctrines that severely limited its applicability. An
analysis

of Pingree

establishes

it has no application

to the

present dispute between Brown's and the Olches.
(1)

Pinaree
Relied On The Purported "Majority Rule" In Its
Analysis; That Rule is Outdated.

Relying solely on nose-counting of a 1953 Oregon decision, the
Pingree Court simply announced that the "majority rule" barred
"agreements to agree". See Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. The Pingree
court conducted no legal analysis of its own. Whatever the status
of that rule in 1953, it is now incorrect:
Leases often contain a provision giving to the lessee an
option for a renewal at a price to be agreed upon . . .
Although there are cases and texts asserting that these
are too uncertain for specific enforcement, the later
cases now generally hold that specific enforcement will
be granted at a rental to be determined by the court as
the reasonable one."
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5A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1964) , § 1174 at 288.
See also Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant
(1980) § 9:6

at 613-14

(the "trend of modern decisions" is to

enforce "agreements to agree").
The Pingree court based its holding solely on the state of the
]_aw in other jurisdictions, and the Cottonwood Mall and Tsern
courts uncritically followed Pingree. Because the law relied on by
Pingree has itself changed since 1953, the sole legal basis for the
Pingree opinion no longer exists.
(2)
In

Pincrree Did Not Address the Utah Legislature's Enactment
of Utah Code Ann. S 70A-2-305
1965

the Utah

Legislature

enacted

L.

1965, Ch. 154,

§2-305, as part of its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C"). Subsections (1) and (2) of § 2-305 provide:
(1)

(2)

The parties if they so intend can conclude a
contract for sale even though the price is not
settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable
price at the time of delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties
and they fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some
agreed market or other standard as set or
recorded by a third person or agency and it is
not so set or recorded.
A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price for him to fix in good faith.

The U.C.C. does not govern real estate transactions. However,
the Utah Supreme Court and other courts look to the U.C.C. for
guidance on commercial transactions even when the U.C.C. does not
control. See, e.g., Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
Livestock Co. , Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). Accordingly,
several courts have specifically analogized to, and relied on,
U.C.C. § 2-305 in specifically enforcing "agreements to agree" on
future lease renewal rates. See, e.g., Drees Farming Assn. v.
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Thompson, 246 N.W.2d 883, 887 n.l

(N.D. 1976); Avcock v. Vantage

Management Co., 554 S.W.2d235, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Moolenaar
v. Co-Build Cos., 354 F. Supp. 980, 984 (D.V.I. 1973).
After the enactment of U.C.C. § 2-3 05, real property is the
sole significant commercial area where "agreements to agree" are
arguably

not

enforceable.

Pingree

and

its progeny

in no

way

establish that real estate "agreements to agree" are any different
from other commercial "agreements to agree". To the contrary, those
cases merely followed general common law as it existed in 1953. A
Utah statute has now changed that common law.

Utah policy is now

to enforce "agreements to agree". Pingree is nothing more than a
historical relic, now lacking conceptual underpinnings.
(3)

Pingree
Did Not Address the Effect of the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing

When Brown's and the Olches executed the Basic Lease they
expressly agreed that its terms would "be incorporated into a final
lease

document

executed

by

both

parties."

There

is

nothing

tentative about the Basic Lease agreement on all the material
elements of a lease. The parties intended to be bound.
In order to avoid their contractual obligations under the
Basic Lease, the Olches presented Brown's with two leases (R. 1838, 45-66) which materially changed the rental terms the parties
had already agreed upon. The Olches then persuaded the trial court
that the parties' failure to reach agreement on immaterial terms
nullified the contract they had already made on all the material
terms necessary to create a lease. In its rulings, the trial court
overlooked or ignored the legal axiom that once Brown's and the
Olches agreed to the Basic Lease, they became subject to a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant").
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The Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern opinions did not
discuss the Covenant. Utah appellate decisions since Pingree have,
however, repeatedly stressed that one party to a contract cannot
defeat

the

reasonable

expectations

of

the

other

party. St.

Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200
(Utah 1991), recently explained the Covenant:
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally
or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the
contract. An examination of express contract terms alone
is insufficient to determine whether there has been a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a
contract in good faith, a party's actions must be
consistent with the agreed common purpose and the
justified expectations of the other party.
A treatise that both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
repeatedly rely on cites the Utah Supreme Court decision in Kier v.
Condrack as establishing an extraordinarily

sweeping duty to

negotiate missing terms in agreements in good faith:
The traditional rule is that an agreement to agree as to
a material term does not result in a binding contract.
Two reasons are given. First, such an agreement leaves a
material term too vague and indefinite to be enforced. It
also may show a lack of present agreement. Thus, an
agreement to agree is equated for indefinite purposes
with a case where the parties purport to agree upon a
term and leave it indefinite. But an agreement to agree
must be distinguished from a situation where the parties
agree to use reasonable efforts to reach agreement for in
such a case there is a duty to negotiate in good faith
and failure to do so results in a breach. In such a case
there may still be a question of what, if any, remedy is
available.
Some of the more modern cases (even without relying on
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
Second. . .) have recognized that agreements to agree
serve a valuable commercial purpose and that the
traditional rule may operate unfairly where a party uses
the rule to defeat an agreement that the parties intended
to be binding.
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A good illustration of the modern cases is an option in
an existing lease that permits the tenant to extend the
lease at a rental fee to be agreed upon at the time of
the exercise of the option. Some cases still follow the
older view that the agreement to agree prevents the
exercise of the option. But, as a recent case stated,
"The better view, however, would hold that such a clause
intends renewal at a 'reasonable' rent and would find
that market conditions are ascertainable with sufficient
certainty to make the clause specifically enforceable."
The case argues that the result coincides with the true
intention of the parties and with fairness because the
lessee has already paid for the option and so should not
be denied the benefit of his bargain on a technicality.
The case discussed above might be regarded as only a
small departure from the traditional rule. If so, let us
examine a case [Kier v. Condrack] that takes a giant step
away from the traditional rule. Plaintiff entered into an
arrangement with defendant whereby he obtained an option
to buy a piece of real property for the sum of $23,500
"on payments and terms to be negotiated provided the same
is exercised by June 1, 1968."
On May 15, plaintiff
sought to exercise the option. He offered to pay $5300 in
cash and to assume two mortgages in the combined amount
of $18,200. The court found as a fact that defendant
refused to negotiate because he changed his mind about
selling. The court stated that plaintiff was free to
suggest a method of payment, that the parties were
obliged to negotiate in good faith, and that defendant
breached this duty. The court concluded that plaintiff's
proposal would satisfy a reasonable man (in any event he
also offered to pay the entire $23,500 in cash) and
therefore a Court of Equity could do what equity and good
conscience requires, decree specific performance based
upon the offer of the plaintiff. It is obvious that here
the court constructs a duty requiring the parties to
negotiate in good faith even though there is no such
provision in the contract.
John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (3d
ed. 1987) § 2-9(3) at 63-64.
Numerous Utah Supreme Court opinions in addition to Kier hold
that parties to "agreements to agree" must engage in good-faith
negotiations of unsettled terms. See, e.g., Tanner v. Baadsgaard,
612 P.2d at 347 ("the parties are duty bound to cooperate in good
faith to carry out their original intent"); Ferris v. Jennings. 595
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P. 2d at 859 (contracting parties must "proceed in good faith to
cooperate in performing" a contract).
The Covenant required the Olches to conduct two different
types

of

good-faith

negotiations.

First,

it

required

them

to

bargain in good faith toward a final lease incorporating the Basic
Lease terms.7 Second, it required the Olches to negotiate in good
faith the rents for the two (2) three-year option periods.8
In Pinaree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern good-faith negotiations
had already taken place between the parties. None of those cases
stands for the proposition that alleged "agreements to agree" are
void ab initio. None suggests the parties do not at least have to
engage in good faith negotiations contemplated by the underlying
agreement. The trial court according erred in holding that Pinaree
freed the Olches from the duty to negotiate ancillary lease terms
and renewal rates in good faith.
C.

Pinaree Was Not Decided on a Motion to Dismiss, and
Involved a Critically Different Factual Situation.

The trial court decided Pinaree only after a bench trial. See
Pinaree 558 P. 2d at 1319. In Pinaree the lease required the renewal
rent to be renegotiated up to a maximum of $900 per month, with
"tax increase, costs of business increases or decreases, business
volume

and

success,

insurance

costs

and

other

reasonable

7

See, e.g., Channel Home Centers, 795 F.2d at 298-99; Fickes v.
Sun Expert, Inc.. 762 F.Supp. 998, 1001 (D. Mass. 1991); Bruce v.
Marchesan Implementos E Maquinas Aaricultas Tatu, S.A., 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18527 at *17-18 (S.D. la. 1980); Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany
& Co., 416 F.Supp. 224, 239-40 (N.D. 111. 1976).
j
i

8

See, e.g., Channel Home Centers, 795 F.2d 291; Charter Medical
Corp. v. Bealick, 741 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Nev. 1987); Family Medical
Blda. v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 684 P.2d 77, 81
(Wash. App.) modified on other grounds, 702 P.2d 459 (Wash. 1984);
In re Gray Line of Boston, Inc., 62 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1986) .
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allowances" serving as the "basis for terms of negotiation." Id. at
1320. The trial court determined that a reasonable monthly rental
under the lease was $900.
In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court found the
provisions unenforceable because " [i]f the factors are considered
in view of the defendant's evidence, a low rental is justified. If
the factors are weighed in light of plaintiff's evidence, the
maximum rental would be appropriate. From the factors specified, a
court

cannot

parties."

derive

an objective

standard

applicable

to

both

Id. at 1321 (emphasis added).

In this case, the trial court concluded that the two option
periods were unenforceable as a matter of law, no matter what the
evidence would have been (R. 1350) . The evidence at trial would
have been that Brown's and the Olches agreed after the execution of
the Basic Lease that the rate for both of the two option periods
would be fair market value (R. 462, 1370) . An agreement to renew a
lease at "fair market value" satisfies the requirements of Pincrree
and numerous other Utah decisions.
Utah courts are legally required to determine the "fair market
value" of various property. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-424
(electric utility services); 57-1-32

(foreclosed real property);

57-8-32.5(3) (property taken by eminent domain). Because Utah trial
courts routinely determine the fair market value of property, there
is no practical nor policy reason why Utah courts are precluded as
a matter of law from determining the fair market value of leased
property if the parties to the lease cannot do so themselves after
engaging in good faith negotiations.
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In Valley Lane Corp. v. Bowen, 592 P.2d 589, 591 (Utah 1979),
the lease provided that renewal rent would be fair market value as
determined by appraisers. The tenant failed to hire an appraiser as
the lease required. The court held that in failing to do so, the
tenant waived his right to renewal. See id. at 592. Then the Court
affirmed the trial court's calculation of "fair market value" for
purposes of the landlord's unlawful detainer action. See id. Bowen
makes clear that

(1) lease renewals at "fair market value" are

enforceable; and

(2) Utah trial courts routinely establish such

figures from disputed evidence.
Numerous other judicial decisions have specifically enforced
agreements to set future lease rates at fair market value existing
at

the

time

of

renewal.9 The Utah

Supreme

Court

opinions

in

Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and Tsern do not require or even support
the trial court's conclusions to the contrary.
periods are specifically enforceable.

The two option

If the Olches refuse to

negotiate the renewal lease rates in good faith, the trial court is
legally empowered to set the rate itself.
B.

Even if the Court Cannot Specifically Enforce The Basic
Lease, Brown's is Still Entitled to Recover Their
Damages.

Even if this Court should, notwithstanding all the foregoing
authority,

find

the

Basic

Lease

9

too

indefinite

for

specific

See, e.g. Bechmann v. Taylor, 249 P. 262, 263 (Colo. 1926);
George Y. Worthington & Son Management Corp. v. Levy, 204 A.2d 334,
336-37 (D.C. 1964); Bernstein v. 1995 Assocs.. 586 N.Y.S.2d 115,
117 (App. Div. 1992), appeal dismissed, 633N.E.2d491 (N.Y. 1994);
Greene v. Leeper, 245 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tenn. 1951);
Avcock v.
Vantage Management Co., 554 S.W.2d 235, 236-37 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977); Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co.. 582 A.2d 123, 126 (Vt.
1990).
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performance, that conclusion has no preclusive effect on Brown's
remaining claims for damages:
One
of
the
fundamental
requirements
for
the
enforceability of a contract is that its terms be certain
enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate
remedy. See § 33. If this minimum standard of certainty
is not met, there is no contract at all. It may be,
however, that the terms are certain enough to provide the
basis for the calculation of damages but not certain
enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific
performance or an injunction and to determine whether the
resulting performance is in accord with what has been
ordered. In that case there is a contract but it is not
enforceable by specific performance or an injunction.
Restatement

(Second) of Contracts, § 362, Comment a.

(emphasis

added) .10
Brown's was prepared to offer evidence at trial establishing
their losses resulting from the Olches' refusal to honor the Basic
Lease agreement. Although the trial court was prepared to permit
testimony on Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s losses for the first three
years (R. 1426, Add. C) it refused to do so for the remaining six
years. The trial court committed error in making this ruling.

10

See also § 362, Illustration 1. (if a contract to construct
a building is too indefinite, a party is still entitled to damages
for breach of contract); Stenehiem v. Kyn Jin Cho, 631 P.2d 482,
495 (Alaska 1981); Augeri v. C.F. Wooding Co., 378 A.2d 538, 540
(Conn. 1977); Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 166 A.2d
726, 732 (Del. Ch. 1960); Powers v. Hastings, 612 P.2d 371, 374
(Wash. 1980);
Glazier v. Glazier, 374 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir.
1967); Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1945)
(all holding a contract may be sufficiently definite to support an
award of damages, although not sufficiently definite to be
specifically performed).
Whether a contract is too indefinite to be specifically
enforceable is a question of fact for the trier of fact, a question
inappropriate for summary dismissal. See Augeri v. C.F. Wooding
Co., 378 A.2d 538, 540 (Conn. 1977). The Basic Lease is more than
sufficient to support a damage award.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Brown 7 s Fraud Claims,
1.

A Manifestation of the Present Intent to be Bound
by an Agreement is a Representation of a ThenExisting Fact.

The Olches admitted that they did not intend to be bound by
the terms of the Basic Lease when they signed it (R. 462, 888) .
That contemporaneous intent not to honor the Basic Lease amounts to
fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure.
The elements of fraud are well established.11 Brown's pled
tevery fraud element.

In response to Brown's fraud claims, the

Olches asserted three defenses:

(1) The Olches' misrepresentations

were not of a "presently existing fact";

(2) because the Basic

Lease is legally unenforceable, there can be no liability for not
intending to be bound by it; and (3) Brown's knew the Basic Lease
would be employed to obtain financing. Brown's claim for fraud is
not

based

on

the

Olches'

use

of

the

Basic

Lease

to

obtain

financing, but on the Olches' execution of it solely for that
purpose, with no intent of ever being bound by its terms.
The

trial

court

erred

in

concluding

the

Olches

made

no

representation of an existing fact. A misrepresentation of intended
11

(1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such a representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon
it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that
parties' injury and damage.
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah
App. 1992) (citing Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124,
126 (Utah 1982)). The misrepresentation may be intentional or
reckless, and may even based on a situation where the party should
have disclosed the correct information but did not. See id.
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future performance satisfies "presently existing fact" requirement
if the representor, at the time of the representation, did not
intend to perform the promise, and made the representation for the
purpose of deceiving the promisee. See Cerritos Trucking Co. v.
Utah Venture No. 1, 645

P.2d

608, 611

(Utah 1982).

See

also

Galloway v. AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989).
To induce Brown's to sign, the Olches represented — contrary to
their then-existing intentions — that they intended to honor the
terms of the Basic Lease.

The Olches had already determined,

however, they would never sign a lease containing the Basic Lease
terms.
Specifically citing Cerritos, Brown's repeatedly argued to the
trial court that a misrepresentation of intended future performance
constituted actionable fraud (R. 1183, 1302-04, 1317). Rejecting
the plain holding of Cerritos, the trial court concluded:
4. Plaintiffs' claim that defendants defrauded them by
misrepresenting their intent to be bound by the Basic
Lease Provisions is insufficient as a matter of law
because there was no representation of a then existing
fact (R. 1424, Add. C ) .
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 & n.2

(Utah 1985),

the appellants argued that their promise to form a jointly owned
corporation with the appellee could not provide the basis for a
fraud action because a false promise to act in the future does not
constitute a misrepresentation of a presently existing material
fact. In rejecting that argument, the Utah Supreme Court used the
strongest language imaginable from an appellate court:
This argument is entirely specious. We have repeatedly
held that a promise of future performance, when made with
a present intent not to perform and made to induce a
party to act in reliance on that promise, constitutes
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actionable deceit and fraud. This principle is a matter
of hornbook law.
This argument is so devoid of merit that we question
whether defendants' counsel has complied with Rule 4 0 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 40(a) states
that the signature of an attorney upon a pleading
constitutes a certificate by the attorney, inter
alia,
that the pleading is "well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law . . . ." (citation omitted).
The trial court erred when it dismissed Brown's fraud claims
that the Olches induced Brown's to execute, and act in reliance on,
the Basic Lease at a time when the Olches

admittedly

had no

intention to honor their obligations thereunder.
2.
Whether

A Promise Can Justifiably Rely on a Promise the Law
Later Determines to be Unenforceable.
a

party

reasonably

relied

on

another

party's

statements is a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g. , Berkeley
Bank for Coops., v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980); Cole v.
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623, 625 (1956) . Despite this rule
reserving the reasonability of reliance for jury determination, the
trial court ruled as a matter of law that under no circumstances
could Brown's reliance on the Basic Lease have been reasonable:
5. . . . Plaintiffs' fraud claim also fails, since a
misrepresentation
of
intent
to be bound
by
an
unenforceable agreement cannot not [sic] constitute
fraud.
6. Similarly, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied
upon the alleged misrepresentations of Defendants' intent
to be bound by an unenforceable argument (R. 1424-25,
Add. C ) .
In ruling that a defrauded person can never reasonably rely on
an unenforceable promise, the trial court committed error:
The question frequently arises, whether the action for
misrepresentation can be maintained when the promise
itself cannot be enforced — as where it is without
consideration, is illegal, is barred by the statute of
frauds, or the statute of limitations, or falls within
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the
parol
evidence
representations.

rule,

or

a

disclaimer

of

One group of cases, undoubtedly in the minority, have
held that it cannot, arguing that to allow the action
would be to permit an evasion of the particular rule of
law which makes the promise unenforceable, or that the
promisee must be deemed to know the law, and must be held
not to have been deceived by such a promise. The
prevailing view, however, permits the action to be
maintained, considering that the policy which invalidates
the promise is not directed at cases of dishonesty in
making it, and that it may still reasonably be relied on
even where it cannot be enforced.
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, (5th ed. 1984), § 109 at 76364.
In Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, 833
F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D. Kan. 1993) a drug repackager claimed that
a

consortium

of

drug

manufacturers

committed

fraud

when

the

consortium promised to negotiate a future business relationship.
There, as here, the defending party had no intent to negotiate at
the time it made its promise. The drug repackager claimed it relied
on the fraudulent promise by not seeking other customers.
The

consortium

of

manufacturers

sought

summary

judgment

asserting their fraud was not actionable under any circumstances
because their promise to negotiate in the future was unenforceable.
See id. at p. 1524. The trial court rejected this argument, holding
that

the

unenforceability

of

a

promise

has

no

necessary

relationship on the reasonability of the promisee's reliance:
The court finds that these cases [relied on by the
consortium] stand for the proposition that an agreement
to make a contract
in the future is unenforceable. In
other words, these cases hold that an agreement to agree
is unenforceable because courts cannot engage in the
practice of supplying the terms of an actual agreement
that the parties promise to reach in the future. These
cases deal with an issue close to but significantly
different from the issue before this court. In this case,
the court is not faced with evidence of an agreement
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between IDWG and PDG to make a contract in the future,
the terms of which must now be gleaned, but rather with
evidence of a specific promise to negotiate an agreement
at a later date, which arguably was designed to and did
cause the promise either to take or to refrain from
taking certain actions, and which the promisor never
intended to keep.
This case poses a different problem. It is not simply
that the promisee allegedly relied on a nebulous promise
which never was fulfilled, it is that the promisor
allegedly never intended to fulfill a specific promise to
negotiate and knowingly led the promisee down a primrose
path which it otherwise would not have taken. Whether
under the circumstances of this case reliance on that
promise was reasonable is a question of fact not of law.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis provided by the court).
The trial court committed reversible error when it ruled, as
a matter of law, that reliance on an unenforceable12 "agreement to
agree"

can

never

constitute

actionable

fraud.

This

Court

accordingly should reverse the dismissal of Brown's fraud claims
and remand them for jury determination.
3.

Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s Stipulation That It Would Have
Lost Money if its Tenancy Ended After the First ThreeYear Period is Irrelevant to Its Fraud Claims.

Next, the trial court concluded Brown's fraud claims were
necessarily doomed because of Tom Brown's deposition testimony that
Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co. would have lost money, and not
executed the Basic Lease, if its tenancy were expressly limited to
three years, with no possibility of renewal:
7. Further, because Plaintiffs would not have entered
into a lease without option periods and would have lost
money if they had done so, there was no reliance by the
Plaintiffs upon any representations by the Defendants to
be bound by the Basic Lease Provisions document.

12

Brown's
in no way
concedes
the
Basic
Lease
is
unenforceable. Even if the Court finds it unenforceable, however,
that determination has no preclusive effect on Brown's fraud
claims.
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8. Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result
of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that
they were unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease
Provisions-and because had Plaintiffs only leased for the
initial three year term they would have lost money.
(R. 1425; Add. C ) .
The trial court's conclusions do not follow from Tom Brown's
testimony for six distinct reasons. First, it provides no support
for the trial court's conclusion that Brown's "were unwilling to
comply with the Basic Lease Provisions."

The trial court was

ruling on a motion to dismiss two hours before trial began. The
trial court had no competent evidence before it on the subject. The
argument of counsel, which of course is not evidence, established
that the Olches, not Brown's, were unwilling to honor the Basic
Lease (R. 1304, 1309-1312, 1524-25). See also pages 49-50, infra.
Second, Tom Brown made clear the loss he referred to in his
deposition resulted because "you need to depreciate your items and
this sort of thing . . ." (R. 1422; Add. C ) . The Evidence at trial
would have been that Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s gross income for the
first three years — before taxes and extraordinary depreciation —
would be $155,017 (R. 540).
Third, the trial court wrongly found it legally irrelevant
that the testimony at trial would have been that Brown's ordered
approximately

$170,000 in shoes for the Park City store which

Brown's was forced to dispose of at a loss (R. 1302, 1305, 1369,
1531, 1535). The trial court refused to recognize that reliance
damages are available in cases of fraud such as the Olches'.
Fourth,
Appellant

the

trial

Brown's

court

General

wrongly

dismissed

Offices.

Brown's

the

claims

addresses

of
the

allowability of those claims at pages 45-46, infra. The evidence at
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trial would have been that Brown's General Offices would have
entered into a contract with Brown's Shoe Fit Co. once Brown's Shoe
Fit Co.'s Park City store opened (R. 1328). The evidence further
would have been that Brown's General Offices would have received 5%
on the gross sales of the store (R. 1329). Brown's argued to the
trial court in connection with the Olches' motion to dismiss that
"sometimes, in fact, the shoe stores will lose money, but it is
still a profitable thing for Brown's entities as a whole, because
General Offices makes the 5 percent." (R. 1329). Brown's General
Offices would have received the 5% fee irrespective of the store's
profitability.
The evidence at trial would have been that Brown's General
Offices would have received $65,139 from Brown's Shoe Fit Co.'s
operations for the first three years, and $293,575 over Brown's
Shoe Fit Co.'s nine-year tenancy (R. 542) . Although these payments
are shown as expenses for the operating shoe store (R. 540), they
would have been revenue to Brown's General offices.
As a consequence, the trial court read Tom Brown's stipulated
testimony

far

too

narrowly.

Brown's

General

Offices

suffered

substantial damages unrelated to any paper losses to be incurred by
the retail shoe store operated by Brown's Shoe Fit Co.
Fifth, the trial court dismissed Brown's fraud claims based on
Tom Brown's

testimony

regarding

damages, yet

inexplicably

was

prepared to let those same contract damage claims proceed to trial:
10. It was the court's determination at the conclusion of
the hearing that it would submit to the jury the issue of
whether the Basic Lease Provisions document represented
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an enforceable agreement
term13 (R. 1426, Add. C) .

for

the

initial

three

year

There is no principled reason why the trial court dismissed
Brown's claims for fraud-induced damages while permitting the jury
to determine Brown's damages generally.
Sixth, the trial court's ruling that the Olches were not
obligated to deal with Brown's fairly and in good faith caused the
trial court to dismiss Brown's claims for damages in future years.
Brown's shows in the immediately following portion of this brief
that the trial court's good faith analysis was incorrect. There is
no legal reason why Brown's tenancy would have necessarily ended
after only three years. See also pages 28-31, supra.
The trial court therefore committed legal error by dismissing
Brown's fraud claims.
D.

The Olches Had a Duty to Negotiate With Brown's in Good
Faith.

Brown's Complaint averred

as a separate claim for relief that

the Olches failed to act in good faith or to deal fairly with
Brown's in various respects (R. 76-77).
Ensign v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 107 Utah 557, 155 P.2d 965,
967 (1945) was one of the first, if not the first, Utah decision to
consider the Covenant:
[The insurance company] could not, of course, by
arbitrary action cancel the policy with the object of
preventing the collection of premiums by plaintiffs and
of securing thereby an advantage to itself. . . . To do
so would evidence a lack of fair dealing which would
13

This conclusion does not refer to Brown's specific
performance claims. The trial court had previously dismissed
Brown's specific performance claims (R. 1294-1296; 1424, Add. C) .
The trial court's Conclusion No. 12 (R. 1426, Add. C) confirms that
only Brown's damages claims — not its specific performance claims
— were to be tried by the jury.
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deprive appellants of the contemplated fruits of their
contract with [the insurance company] (emphasis added).
In Hovt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927, 930
(1953) the Court considered the claims of a real estate broker who
demonstrated his principals had failed to consummate a transaction
presented to it by their agent. The Hoyt court held:
That agreement certainly contemplated that the plaintiff
would cooperate in good faith toward the accomplishment
of the purpose of which he employed defendant. He cannot
be permitted to procure them to obtain a buyer, on terms
accepted by the plaintiff, and then prevent the
accomplishment of what he requested and authorized them
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the
transaction.
More recently, this court has recognized that the covenant
exists in every contract. See Olympus Hills Center, Ltd v. Smith's
Food & Drug Centers, Inc. , 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994) cert,
denied, 889 P. 2d 1231 (1995) . Simply stated, the Covenant requires
parties to act in good faith toward completion of the contract,
consistent

with

the

agreed

common

purpose

and

the

justified

expectations of the other party. Id.
As noted by this court, the reason for the Covenant is that
"contracting parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every
understanding to a stated term."

Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450.

As a result, there is a generalized duty to act in good faith
toward completion of the contract. See also Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d
552, 564 n.18 (Utah App. 1994):
Good faith limits the exercise of discretion in
performance conferred on party by the contract. . . [A]
party may deprive the other of these anticipated benefits
for a legitimate (or good faith) reason. The same act
will be a breach of the contract if undertaken for an
illegitimate (or bad faith) reason. The covenant is not
intended to open a "Pandora's box" of liability, but
rather is meant to ensure that the spirit of the contract
is fulfilled, (citations omitted)
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Whether viewed in terms of an entitlement, a vested right, a
reasonable expectation, the fruits of their labors, the realization
of a common purpose, or in some other way, Brown's was justified in
its expectations that Defendants would to enter into good-faith
negotiations (1) for a lease incorporating the agreed-upon terms in
the Basic Lease; and

(2) to establish the rental rate for each

option period. Given that the parties had already agreed to Brown's
tenancy of the Premises, the trial court should have permitted the
jury to determine whether

the Olches' actions

in refusing

to

negotiate certain remaining terms, or to even be bound by the
original terms, constituted a breach of their duty of good faith
and fair dealing. See also pages 28-31, supra.
For the trial court's dismissal to stand, the Olches have the
burden of proving to this Court that under no factual circumstances
could

a

jury

have

determined

the

Olches

failed

to

negotiate

commercially reasonable14 lease terms in good faith. The Olches
cannot meet their burden. Moreover, this Court has explicitly held
that

claims alleging breach of the Covenant

are not

properly

disposed of through summary dismissals. See, e.g., Republic Group,
883 P.2d at 291;

Weis, 871 P.2d at 565.

See also Market Street

Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594-98 (7th Cir.
1991) ("the essential issue bearing on a defendant's good faith is
the defendant's state of mind, 'a type of inquiry that ordinarily
cannot be concluded on summary judgment. . .'")

14

The Olches' two proposed leases were the most commercially
unreasonable leases Brown's California real estate counsel has seen
(R. 285-86).
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Brown's claimed in their Complaint, and would have introduced
evidence

at

trial,

that

the

Olches

sought

to

evade

their

obligations to Brown's by repeatedly insisting Brown's execute
commercially unreasonable, unsignable leases, and otherwise failing
to deal with Brown's fairly or in good faith. Brown's has the right
to present this evidence to the jury, and the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing Brown's claims that the Olches breached the
Covenant.
E.

Brown's General Offices is a Party to the Contract
with Defendants, and is thus Entitled to Recover
its Damages for Defendants' Breach Thereof.

Appellant

Brown's

General

Offices,

Inc.

is

a partner

in

Appellant Brown's Shoe Fit Co., and therefore a party to the Basic
Lease Agreement. As a result, Brown's General Offices is entitled
to recover any damages it foreseeably incurred as a consequence of
the Olches' breach of that agreement. Such damages are recoverable
because Brown's General Office, Inc. is in contractual privity with
the Olches. Under Utah law, partners are jointly and individually
liable for the contractual obligations of the partnership. See Utah
Code Ann. § 48-1-12

(1994) . Likewise, partners are entitled to

enforce a partnership contract with a third party. See Cottonwood
Mall Company v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) .
Consequently, partners are considered to be in privity of
contract with the third party, since partners are both liable for
the contractual duties, and entitled to enforce its obligations.
See Havnes v. Therrien, No. L-89-306, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494, *7
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990); In re Camhi, 208 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1960). Because partners are considered to be in privity with
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the third party, partners are entitled to all contractual remedies
in the case of a breach by the third party. See id.
While a particular partner's damages will generally be the
same as those of the partnership or other partners, this is not
always the case. As a result, where one partner has

suffered

damages distinct from those of the partnership or other partners,
that

partner

can

recover

those

damages

in

addition

to

those

incurred by the partnership or other partners. See Kemp v. Murray,
680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984).
In

this

$295,947

case,

Brown's

General

Offices

stood

to

receive

(R. 541) over a nine-year period as a result of the

service contract with the partnership, based on 5% of the shoe
store's gross sales (R. 540, 542). Brown's General Offices would
have

received

this

money

irrespective

of

the

shoe

store's

profitability, and independent of its status as a partner. Solely
as a result of the Olches' breach, Brown's General Offices was
deprived of the benefit of that contract. Because Brown's General
Offices is in privity of contract with Olches, it is entitled to
recover

its

particularized

damages

foreseeably

caused

by

the

Olches' breach.
P.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling on Brown's Equitable
Claims Before the Jury Had Ruled on Brown's Legal Claim
Based on Common Facts.

An action for specific performance is equitable in nature. It
is axiomatic that the trial court, not the jury, decides the issues
in

equity

equitable

cases. The

trial

issues itself; or,

court

may

either

(1)

decide

the

(2) use the jury in an advisory

capacity. In the latter event, the court remains free to reject the
advisory

jury's

verdict.

The

acceptance
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or

rejection

of

the

advisory verdict is not subject to appellate review. See Romrell v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980).
Even if the trial court reserves equitable decisions
itself,

however,

the

court

is

still

bound

by

the

for

jury's

determination of all factual/legal issues. See Goldberg v. Jay
Timmons & Assocs. , 896 P.2d 1241, 1244

(Utah App. 1995). As a

result, any ruling on equitable issues must be held in abeyance
until the jury has entered its verdict on factual/legal issues:
Where the right to jury trial exists with respect to any
claim, it cannot be vitiated by trying first to the court
an equitable claim predicated on common facts.
Id. (quoting, 5 James W. Moore et al. , Moore's Federal Practice
H 38.16[4]

(1994)).

See also

Zions First Nat'l

Bank v.

Rocky

Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990) .
The trial court never announced whether it would permit the
jury to act in an advisory capacity. Even though the trial court
intended to permit the jury to determine "whether the Basic Lease
Provisions was an enforceable agreement"

(R. 1426, Add. C) , the

trial court nevertheless first took it upon itself to rule on the
equitable issues before the jury had even been empaneled. In doing
so, the trial court committed reversible error.
G.

The Trial Court Erred
Undisputed,

in Finding Certain Facts Were

The trial court dismissed Brown's claims essentially based on
language from three sources:

(1) the parties7 trial briefs; (2)

the arguments of counsel; and (3) the stipulated testimony of Tom
Brown contained in Finding No. 14 (R. 1422, Add. C) . No motion for
summary judgment was before the trial court.

Counsel for the

parties repeatedly made proffers of what trial evidence would be.
47

Based on the limited, and in most cases nonexistent, evidence
before it, the trial court made various "findings", reciting in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 1417-27, Add. C) that
its findings were based on "undisputed facts." (R. 1418, Add. C) .
To the contrary, the trial court made findings that Brown's hotly
disputed.
During the November 14, 1996 hearing on Brown's objections to
various findings, the following exchange occurred in connection
with

Brown's

request

that

they

be

permitted

to

include

some

proffers of what trial evidence would have been:
Mr. WYCOFF: Let me speak to the request I have made. The
reviewing court can't operate totally in a vacuum. Now,
the Court rules, as a matter of law, based mainly on the
Cottonwood Mall case, that an agreement to agree couldn't
be enforceable. Now—if that's the law in Utah, which we
question, for a lot of reasons, it is only the question
with respect to real property. Article 2 has thrown it
out of the UCC. It is no longer the law for anything
except, possibly, real property. But there are shades,
variances, one rule in Colorado, one rule in Arizona, one
rule in Connecticut, one rule in the Virgin Islands. They
even have a case. As far as what is sufficient—what
constitutes a sufficient agreement to agree. How in the
world, your Honor, can the appellate court, on a motion
to dismiss, as a matter of law, how can they address this
issue, without knowing what the testimony would have been
if the Court had not dismissed it?
Mr. BURBIDGE:

They have a transcript.

THE COURT: On the other hand, the Court is not obligated
to do the appellate court's work. This Court makes
findings, legal conclusions that flow from the findings,
and an order that tracks the findings and the
conclusions, and that's all this Court is obligated to
do. And to now come back and try and anticipate where the
appellate court is going to focus on reviewing the trial
court's work is just inappropriate. This Court is
unwilling to do it.
(R. 1534-35).
As

a

consequence

various proffers

of

of trial

the

trial

evidence
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court's position,
and points

Brown's

of dispute

are

scattered throughout the record. Those proffers of trial evidence
establish

substantial

dispute

regarding

the

trial

court's

"undisputed" Finding No. 12:
12. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995 the parties
exchanged correspondence and drafts of proposed lease
agreements for the Property, but no final lease agreement
was ever agreed to by the parties. In this connection,
Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which,
unlike the Basic Lease Provisions document, provided a
mechanism for appraisers to set the rent during the
option periods if the parties could not agree.
(R. 1422, Add. C).
Brown's made clear to the trial court there were subsequent
modifications to the Basic Lease (R.1275).

Brown's suggested the

use of appraisers solely to provide a logical method to establish
the fair-market rent the parties had agreed to for the two option
periods.

It is undisputed Brown's made the suggestion.

It is,

however, disputed whether the suggestion changed the parties'
agreement as the trial court concluded.
The trial court based its Conclusion No. 8 on Finding 12:
8. Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result
of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that
they were unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease
Provisions—and because had Plaintiffs only leased for the
initial three year term they would have lost money.
(R.1425, Add. C) (emphasis added).
Brown's is aware of their duty to marshal evidence. A party
can marshal evidence, however, only when it exists. Brown's only
stipulation appears at the trial court's Finding No. 14 (R. 1422,
Add. C) , which says nothing about Brown's "unwillingness" to comply
with the Basic Lease or anything else.

It is true Brown's would

not accept the Olches' unilateral proposed leases, and insisted on
some protection from the Olches' blatant overreaching, but this
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arose only after the Olches presented proposed outrageous leases
that materially changed provisions the parties had already agreed
to in the Basic Lease (R. 1311-12, 1359).

Similarly the Olches,

not Brown's, insisted on the premature determination — through
appraisers or otherwise — of the additional rent for the two option
periods (R. 1314, 1359).
The trial court erred when it

(1) made "findings" with no

support in the record, and (2) weighed disputed evidence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the trial
court's dismissal of Brown's claims.
DATED May

IB

1997.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
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(rfaffi
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Attorneys for Appellants
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa
partnership; TOM BROWN; and,
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an
Iowa corporation,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

]

]
NO.970199-CA

vs.
JON OLCH; JANET OLCH; HENRY
SIGG; and 33 0 MAIN STREET
PARTNERS,

]
]
)

Defendants/Appellees

ADDENDUM

Priority 15

Addendum A

BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS
Following are terms and conditions agreed upon by and between 330 Main Street Partners
a Utah Limited Liability Corp. and Brown's Shoe Fit Co. to be incorporated into a final lease
document executed by both parties.
TERM OF LEASE The initial lease term will be for three years. Lessee will have the option
to renew the lease for two additional three year option periods. The terms and conditions of the
option periods are specified herein and will be incorporated into the lease agreement.
TENANT IMPROVEMENTS Brown's Shoe Fit Co, will be responsible for making the
necessary tenant improvements required to operate a shoe business. Paint ready walls, suspended
ceilings (or similar), heating, electrical and "slab" floor will be provided by Lessor.
RENTAL AMOUNT
Year One - base rent of $19 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6%
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent.
I

Second Year - base rent of $21 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6%
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent.
Third Year - base rent of $23 per square foot. In addition to the base rent, tenant will pay 6%
of any gross volume over $600,000 as additional rent.
All rent paid will be on a N N N basis and include tenants pro rata share of property
taxes, insurance and utilities. The first three year option will not include a CPI increase.
FIRST OPTION PERIOD Base rent will be $24 per square foot. Prior to commencement of
the first option period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from which to
base additional rent paid during each year of the first option period. Each successive year of the
. first option period will include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum monthly rental.
SECOND OPTION PERIOD Base rent for the second option period will be that amount paid
the last year of the first option period plus the CPI increase. Prior to commencement of the
second option period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from which to
base additional rent paid during each year of the second option period. Each successive year of
the second option period will include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum monthly rental.
IMPROV
NT. LOCATION AND SIZE The size of the leasehold space will range from
1750 sq
to 1850 sq. ft. as per approved plans. The location of the premises is a building to
ately 330 Main Street, Park City, Utah,
be loc

^ 7
Browns/Shoe Fit Co
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treet Partners t>ate

Date
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Addendum B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO
CASE NUMBER 950300038 CN
DATE 12/11/95
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER MIDGLEY, ED
COURT CLERK JDO

PLAINTIFF
VS
OLCH, JON
OLCH, JANET
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

DEFENDANT
MOTION HEARING
STIPULATION

P. ATTY. VANDAM, R. PAUL
D. ATTY.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY IS GRANTED AND COURT
ORDERS THAT W-2'S AND 1099'S IN LIEU OF TAX RETURNS ARE TO BE
GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF BUT THAT THEY ARE ONLY TO BE DIVULGED TO THE
ATTORNEYS WORKING ON THIS CASE; NOT THE CLIENTS.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE IS GRANTED ON THE
"PUNITIVE DAMAGE" ISSUE. COURT FINDS THAT THE "FRAUD" CLAIM IS
A JURY ISSUE.
COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE 4TH CAUSE OF ACTION;
BUT DENIES DEFENDANT MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT AND
IT HAS SUFFIENT TERMS TO BE ENFORCED AND IT WAS THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF "A LEASE".
ON THE MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUES OF DAMAGES
MR. FELTON WILL SUBMIT THOSE BY NEXT MONDAY BUT HE NEEDS MORE
TIME FOR DISCOVERY ON OTHER ISSUES. COURT INSTRUCTS COUNSEL TO
MAKE A MOTION FOR MORE DISCOVERY TIME ON THE OTHER ISSUES.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE MAY PROVE SOMEWHAT HELPFUL IF COUNSEL
WANT TO MEET TODAY WHILE THEY ARE HERE AND COURT IS WILLING TO
START THE PROCEEDINGS IF COUNSEL AGREE.
MR. WYCOFF IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
COUNSEL PRESENT INCLUDE R^ PAUL VANDAM, BRUCE WYCOFF & ROBERT FELTON.

U4 C J^

Addendum C

No. .

FI LED

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#04 92)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Jon and Janet Olch
13 9 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677

OB i.. m
CWcotSummitCounty

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO.,
an Iowa partnership; TOM
BROWN; and BROWN'S GENERAL
OFFICES, an Iowa corporation,
Plaintiffs,
-vsJON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY
SIGG and 33 0 MAIN STREET
PARTNERS,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY
SIGG and 33 0 MAIN STREET
PARTNERS,
Counterclaimants,
-vsBROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an
Iowa partnership; BROWN'S
SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa
corporation; TOM BROWN;
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an
Iowa corporation; and
JOHN DOES 2-5,
Counterdefendants.

) Civil No. 950300038 CN
) Judge Pat B. Brian
)
)
)
)
)
)

^ .

A hearing was held in this matter on June 11, 1996 at the
hour of 8:30 a.m., at the commencement of trial, for the purpose
of addressing certain legal issues in the matter.

Plaintiffs

appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Paul
Van Dam and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
Defendants Jon and Janet Olch appeared in person and by and through
their

counsel

Mitchell.

of

record, Richard

D.

Burbidge

of Burbidge

&

Defendants 330 Main Street Partners and Henry Sigg

appeared in person and by their counsel of record Robert Felton.
The court, at an earlier hearing held June 6, 1996, had
requested that both parties file memoranda respecting the legal
issues that they believed should be determined by the court prior
to and/or during the trial.

Both parties filed written memoranda

as requested by the court.
The court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda filed
by the parties and having heard extensive oral arguments and the
responses by counsel to specific inquiries by the court concerning
undisputed facts and the respective positions of the parties, and
the court being fully apprised in the matter, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The

court

determines

that

the

undisputed:

2

14Lb

following

facts

are

1.

The Plaintiff, Brown's Shoe Fit, is a partnership

formed for the purpose or with the prospect of opening a shoe store
in Park City, Utah, in a building to be constructed by Defendants.1
2.

The Plaintiff, Brown's General Offices, is an Iowa

corporation with
Obispo.

its principal place

of business

in San

Luis

Brown's General Offices represents itself to be one of the

general partners of Brown's Shoe Fit. Tom Brown represents himself
to be the other partner.

In addition to its position as a general

partner of Brown's Shoe Fit of Park City, Brown's General Offices
seeks

to

assert

a

separate

claim

as

against

the

Defendants

contending it had a management agreement with the partnership and
thus allegedly lost money when the shoe store was not established.
3.

Defendants Jon Olch, Janet Olch and Henry Sigg are

individuals who, together with Tim Lapage, formed a partnership for
the purpose of owning land and developing an office building at
the

common

address

of

340 Main

Street, Park

City,

Utah

(the

"Property"). 2
4.

On or about March 18, 1994, Tom Brown, acting for

Brown's Shoe Fit Company, and Henry Sigg, acting for 330 Main
Street Partners, executed that certain document entitled Basic
Lease

Provisions

relating to Brown's prospective

leasing of a

portion of the Property.

While there is a factual question concerning whether or not the partnership was actually formed,
for purposes of these findings, the court assumes, arguendo, that the partnership, Browns Shoe Fit, was formed
for the purpose of establishing a retail shoe store in Park City, Utah.
2
The Property was originally thought to have an address of 330 South Main. It ultimately was given
an address of 340 South Main.

3

141b

5. While Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree about whether
they intended the document to be a binding agreement, it is
undisputed that the parties contemplated that before Plaintiffs
occupied the Property, a final lease document would be executed.
In that respect, the Basic Lease Provision document provides as
follows:
Following are terms and conditions
by and between 33 0 Main Street Partners a
Liability Corp. and Brown's Shoe Fit
incorporated into a final lease document
the parties. [Emphasis added].
6.

agreed upon
Utah Limited
Co. to be
executed by

The Basic Lease Provisions document refers to three

potential rental terms (periods), namely an initial three (3) year
term and two successive three (3) year options.
7.

The Basic Lease Provisions document addressed the

rental amount for the prospective terms of a lease as containing
two basic components:
the gross volume.

(1)

a base rent; and (2) a percentage of

The base rent for the initial three year term

was set forth as $19.00, $21.00 and $23.00 per square foot,
respectively, together with an additional rental constituting 6%
of any gross volume over $600,000.00. The term "gross volume" was
not defined by the Basic Lease Provisions document.
8.

With respect to the two successive three year option

periods, the parties specified only the base rent, but did not
specify the percentage rent, which, according to the document, was
to be agreed upon between the parties at a later date, after the
commencement of a lease but prior to the expiration of the initial
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term.

In that respect, the Basic Lease Provisions document

contains the following language:
FIRST OPTION PERIOD Base rent will be $24 per square
foot.
Prior to commencement of the first option
period, Lessor and Lessee must agree on the gross
volume figure from which to base additional rent paid
during each year of the first option period. Each
successive year of the first option period will
include a CPI increase, in addition to the minimum
monthly rental.
SECOND OPTION PERIOD Base rent for the second option
period will be that amount paid the last year of the
first option period plus the CPI increase. Prior to
commencement of the second option period, Lessor and
Lessee must agree on the gross volume figure from
which to base additional rent paid during each year
of the second option period. Each successive year of
the second option period will include a CPI increase,
in addition to the minimum monthly rental.
9.

Neither party contended that the above-referenced

language with respect to rent in the option periods was ambiguous
or that any other agreements modified or supplemented the language.
10.
inherent

The Basic Lease Provisions document contains an

conflict because it provides there would be no CPI

increase in the first option period, but thereafter provides
specifically for a CPI increase in that option period.
11.

The Basic Lease Provisions document did not contain

a lease commencement date.
12.

During the fall of 1994 and early 1995, the parties

exchanged correspondence and drafts of proposed lease agreements
for the Property, but no final lease agreement was ever agreed to
or

entered

into

between

the parties.

In

this

connection,

Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which, unlike the
Basic

Lease

Provisions

document,

provided

5
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a

mechanism

for

appraisers to set the rent during the option periods if the parties
could not agree.
13.

Plaintiffs would not have entered into a final lease

agreement which did not provide for two

(2) three-year

option

periods because Plaintiffs would have lost money if they only had
a right to lease the Property for an initial three year term.
14.

In that

respect,

Plaintiffs

stipulated

that

the

following deposition testimony of Tom Brown was true and accurately
stated Plaintiffs' position:
Q. So I take it that at the end of the day you
were prepared to sign a lease if all the term was, was
three years, no options; is that true?
A. No.
Q.
In order to sign a lease you required at
least two option periods of three years each?
A. Yes.
Page 57, MR. VAN DAM: Go ahead.
Line 4, THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't have done
it strictly on three years.
Q. (By Mr. Burbidge) I just ask, why not?
A. Because if you need to depreciate your items
and this sort of thing, you don't even get a run at
it in three years.
Q. So you would end up losing money?
A.
15.

Losing money.

[Tom Brown Depo., pp. 56-57] .

Brown's General Offices was not a named signatory to

the Basic Lease Provisions document, was not intended to be a named
signatory to any final lease agreement, if any could be reached,
nor was it to be a tenant in the subject building.
16.

Subsequent to the time that the Plaintiffs filed this

action, the space that is the subject of this litigation was leased
to one or more third parties who were not joined as parties to this
action.
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17. Such tenants claim an interest in the Property and the
disposition of

Plaintiffs' specific performance

claim

in the

absence of such tenants as parties to this action may impair or
impede their ability to protect that interest and/or leave the
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple
or

otherwise

inconsistent

obligations.

There

is

no

reason

presented to the court that such tenants could not have been joined
in this action.
The court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs' Claims for Damages Relating to the Option Periods
1.

Although the Basic Lease Provisions document as a

matter of law meets the duration and location requirements for an
enforceable lease, it does not specify the rent for the two (2)
option periods, but only contains a classic "agreement to agree"
to such rent in the future, which agreements are not enforceable.
Accordingly, even if the Basic Lease Provisions document was
intended to be a binding agreement, Plaintiffs had no enforceable
right

to

lease

the Property

during the two option periods.

Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for damages with respect to the option
periods arising out of the alleged breach of the Basic Lease
Provisions document should be dismissed as a matter of law.

14<:o

Plaintiffs1 Claim for Specific Performance
2.

Utah

law

is

clear

that

in

order

for

specific

performance to lie, the agreement must be clear and definite. The
Basic Lease Provisions document is too vague and indefinite for
this court to order specific performance thereof, including the two
(2) option periods.
3. In addition, the tenants now occupying the space within
the area subject of the parties' negotiations are indispensable
parties and would be required to be joined to this action in order
for Plaintiffs to pursue the remedy of specific performance.
Plaintiffs' failure to join the tenants as parties mandates --as
a matter of

law -- the dismissal with prejudice

of all of

Plaintiffs' specific performance claims.
Plaintiffs' Fraud Claim
4.

Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants defrauded them by

misrepresenting

their intent to be bound by the Basic Lease

Provisions is insufficient as a matter of law because there was no
misrepresentation of a then existing fact.
have

reasonably

or

detrimentally

Plaintiffs could not

relied

on

the

claimed

misrepresentation and Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate
result of the claimed misrepresentation.
5.

Damages did not and could not have resulted from the

position asserted by the Plaintiffs.

The lease option for the

first three years and the lease option for the second three years
simply did not state the most fundamental of all requirements for
a lease, and that is how much the lessor is going to charge and the
8
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lessee

is going

to be

required

to pay

for

the premises.

Plaintiffs' fraud claim also fails, since a misrepresentation of
intent to be bound by an unenforceable agreement cannot not
constitute fraud.
6. Similarly, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied
upon the alleged misrepresentation of Defendants1 intent to be
bound by an unenforceable agreement.
7. Further, because Plaintiffs would not have entered into
a lease without option periods and would have lost money if they
had done so, there was no reliance by the Plaintiffs upon any
representations by the Defendants to be bound by the Basic Lease
Provisions document.
8.

Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a proximate result

of the alleged fraud because Plaintiffs stipulate that they were
unwilling to comply with the Basic Lease Provisions-and because had
Plaintiffs only leased for the initial three year term they would
have lost money.
Brown's General Offices' Claim Regarding Management Agreement
9.

The only potentially legally cognizable claim of

Brown's General Offices was as a partner of Brown's Shoe Fit.
Brown General Offices' claim for damages based upon a management
agreement it allegedly would have entered into with the Plaintiff
partnership had the partnership established a shoe store in Park
City is barred as a matter of law.
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Plaintiffs' Other Claims
10.

It was the court's determination at the conclusion of

the hearing that it would submit to the jury the issue of whether
the Basic Lease Provisions document represented an enforceable
agreement for the initial three year term.
11.

At the conclusion of the court's hearing and the

court's announcement of its determination with respect to the
above-referenced

legal issues, Plaintiffs stipulated

that the

testimony of Tom Brown, as set forth in paragraph 14 of the court's
Findings of Fact was true and was the position of Plaintiffs.
12.

Plaintiffs moved for dismissal of the remainder of

their claims with prejudice with the Defendants' stipulation that
in the event this court's ruling with respect to the enforceability
of the option periods of the Basic Lease Provisions document is
reversed, then, and only then, Plaintiffs could renew their claims
for damages respecting the initial term of the lease, if any, that
would have been entered into and that Defendants would not assert
in that narrow instance any defense based upon the statute of
limitations.

Accordingly, the court accepts the stipulation and

grants the motion and the remainder of Plaintiffs' claims should
be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this /^xday of December, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT B. BRTAN
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BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Defendants Jon Olch
and Janet Olch

ROBERT FELTON
Attorneys for Defendants 33 0 Main
Street Partners and Henry Sigg
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

tfJL VAN DAM
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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